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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AuTOMOBILES-CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE MAKING OWNER LIABI.£
FOR INJURY CAUSED BY ANOTHER"s NEGLICENT DRIVING.-The automobile of
D, driven negligently by his fifteen-year-old son. injured P. In an action
for damages, D offered evidence that his son took and was driving the automobile against his express orders. Held, such evidence is not admissible in
view of PUBLIC Acrs oF 1915, No. 302, Sec. 29, providing that if the motor
vehicle is being driven at the time of the injury by an immediate member
of the owner's family it shall be conclusivdy presumed that it was with tho::
owner's consent and knowledge. (Affirmed by a divided court.) Hawkin;
v. Ermatinger (Mich., 1920), 179 N. ,V. 249.
The aim of this statute is to place upon the owner liability for damage
caused by his automobile's negligent operation by an immediate member of
his family. This is in effect a substantive rule of law, not a mere rule of
evidence. WIGMORE'S EVIDENCE, Vol. 2, p. 1665. The statute making the
owner liable without fault on his part, if within the power of the legislature,
must be within their police power. The police power of a state embrace£
all regulations designed to prome>te the general welfare or prosperity. Ch:cago Ry. Co. v. Drainage Comm., 200 U. S. 561; Noble State Bank Y. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104; Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137· The legislature in the exercise of this power may regulate the use of vehicles on the
streets and highways. Radnor v. Bell, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. l; People v. Sclmeidcr, 139 Mich. 673. To justify the state in thus interposing its police powe.in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon the individual. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133. Such legislation will not be overthrown by the courts unless utterly unreasonable or purely arbitrary. Otis
v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6; McLean v. State of Arkansas, 2n U. S. 53!:i;
Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578. The automobile driven by an irresponsible driver is indeed a danger and some reasonable means of protecting
the public from such danger is a proper act of the legislature. But such
protective legislation must be considered in relaticn to 1he due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. A father is not liable for the: tort of his
child simply because of paternity. Smith v. I ordan, 2n Mass. 269; Zeeb v.
Balmmaier, 103 Kan. 599. This statute, holding a party absolutely liable for
the conduct of another, no matter how careful or free from negligenci> he
himself has been, is in effect taking the property of one party to pay for the
wrongful and negligent act of another, not in the relntion of a servant or
agent to him. Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371. This is indeed taking
property without due process of law. C11mp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291. To
be sure, the rights of the individual are not free from reasonable enactments
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in the interest of the common welfare. Cal. Reduction- Co. v. Sanitary Co.,
199 U. S. 3o6; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. \Vhether or not a particular statute is reasonable must depend, then, on the enormity of the -evil and
the fitness oi such legislation .to afford a remedy. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.
S. 590. It. is suggested that a statute imposing liability without fault is very
harsh and should be disfavored by the courts. There should be adopted a
more reasonable method of enforcing a duty upon the owner of an automobile to keep it safe from negligent drivers. The danger from carelessly
driven automobiles would not seem to be so great that a remedy as' confiscatory as the one in the principal case is needed. It is submitted that the
above statute should be held unconstitutional as being an unreasonanle and
arbitrary method of accomplishing the purpose of the legislature.
BRoI<ERS-NoT ENTITLED To Coll!MISSIONS FOR SALE oF STEAMERS PimVENTED nY WAR SHIPPING STATUTE AND PF.OCLA:MA'.l.'ION.-On January 27,
1917, the. plaintiffs, shipbrokers, ei:itered into a. contract to sell two steamers
for the defendants. A Canadian firm was procured as a buyer, the sale to
be subjecl to its inspection. On February ;;, 1917, before the sale was completed, a proclamation was issued by the President, declaring ·an emerge"lcy
and calling into effect a statute enacted September 7, 1916, prohibiting the
sale of United States registered vessels to foreign owners unless first tendered to the Shipping Board. 'fhe Shipping Board declined to permit the
sale and the defendant refused to transfer the steamers. In an action to
recover commissions, held, the statute and proclamation constituted a legal
justification and excuse for defendant's refusal to perform, and no commissions could be recovered. Damers v. Trident Fisheries Cfl. (Me., 1920), III
Atl. 418.
If performance of a contract becomes impossible or illegal by reason
of a change in the law, the promisor is no longer bound. American Mercantile E.-rch. v. Blimt, 102 Me. 128; Pitblic Service Co. v. Public Utility
Commrs., 87 N. J. L. 128; Lowe:;• v. Granite State Prov. Assn., 28 N. Y.
Supp. 560; Andrew Miller & Co. v. Taylor & Co., [1916] 1 KB. 402. The
law on this subject has been greatly augmented by litigation growing out
of the war and its effect on the performance of contracts. It has been held
,that a party who becomes unable to perform a contract due to anticipatory
war measures will be excused from further performance. Foster v. Compagnie Franfaise de Navigatfrm a Vaprnr, 237 Fed. 858. Likewise, the outbreak of war, making illegal commercial intercourse with enemy countries,
will excuse a vendor from delivering goods to an enemy subject. Jager v.
Toline, [1916] l K. B. 939; Edward (Jrey & Co. v. Tolfoe (1915), 31 Times
L. R. 551. Or from delivering goods which were to be obtained from an
enemy country. Vertl1ardt & Hall v. Rylands Bros. (1917), 86 L. J. Ch. (N.
S.) 6o4; Cooper v. Neilson & i1rfa:rw;!ll (1919), Viet. L. R. 66; or to be
manufactured in enemy territory. Ross v. Shaw (1917), 2 Ir. R. 367. For
many other recent cases see note in 3 A. L. R. n. In the instant case it
was objected that the statute did not apply, having been made before the
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contract was entered into. This would seem to be immaterial, since the
statute was inoperative until the President's proclamation, which was after
the contract was entered into but before its completion. If by this argument it is meant ·that both parties having known of the enactment at the
time the arrangement was made, the vendor should thereby be deemed to
have assumed the risk of procuring the Shipping Board's consent to a sale
in case the statute should be called into effect, and agreed to pay the commissions in any event, the contention is unsound. This argument was made
in an English case where the parties entered into an agreement for the sale
of a quantity of aluminum to be shipped by the seller to a foreign company,
at a time when to the knowledge of both parties there was a government
prohibition of the export of aluminum except on license of the British government. It was held that the law would not impose an absolute obligation
to do what the law forbade, and that the contract was subject to an implied
condition that an export license could be obtained. A11glo-Rmsian Traders
v. John Butt & Co., [1917] 2 K. B. 679. The reasoning would apply equally
well to the instant case. For a full discussion of many cases dealing with
war-time impossibility of performance, see 18 MICH. L. ~v. 589. See also
35 LAW Q. ~v. 84; 38 CANADIAN LAW Tu.i::i,;s 86.
CHARITIES-APPLICATION "Cy PRES."-Testator devised specific real property, including a hotel, in trust to sell part of the property, and operate the
hotel in testator's name, and from the proceeds and profits raise a sinking
fund for the permanent operation and improvement of the hotel, and thereafter to apply the funds to specific charities. After testator's death a modern
hotel was erected in the same city and because of its competition testator's
hotel could not be maintained and operated in the future at a profit or :.o
as to provide an income for the charities designated. Plaintiff, heir at law
of testator, claims that, in view of the changed conditions and circumstances,
the provision in the will for the charities must fail, and therefore prays that
a decree be entered vesting the title to the property in him. Held, the intention to give the funds to the charities specified will be given effect, though
the mode prescribed cannot" be followed. H odga v. W ellmmi (Ia., 1920), 179
N. W. 534
The doctrine of the cy pres application of charitable trusts, as a branch
of the general equitable powers of a court of chancery, has been extensively
recognized in some form throughout the United States. On the other hand,
the doctrine has been wholly rejected in some states. See Crim v. Williamson, 180 Ala. 179; Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S. C. 455. Courts of equily favor gifts
to charity, and in the jurisdictions which have adopted the cy pres doctrine
the courts have held that if the mode pointed out in the will for carrying
the gift into effect fails the court will provide another mode by which it
may take effect. See Jansen v. Godair (Ill., 1920), 127 N. E. 97; Adams v.
Page, 76 N. H. ¢. In the latter case, where the testator's plan to provide
:a hospital for those living in a certain community had become impracticable
by reason of the establishment of a similar institution by others, the court
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carried out his intention by ordering that the trust property be used for the
benefit of the hospital already in operation. If, then, a court of equity, by
the application of cy pres doctrine, will order the trust property to be used
for a charity other than the one specified by the testator because it would
be impractjcable to carry out his. specific intention, a fortiori should they apply
the cy pres doctrine when the impracticability arises merely in the mode of
the administration of the trust property. As pointed out in the principll
case, where the essential thing in the testator's mind was the mode prescribed for carrying out his wishes, and not a general intent to devote
the funds to charity, the doctrine of cy pres cannot apply if the particular
mode prescribed by the testator is impracticable or 1l!egal. In the instant
case definite charities were created, but the particular mode by which they
were to be effectuated had become impossible. By substituting another mode
the substantial intention of the testator was not made to depend upon his
formal intention. The doctrine cy pres adopted to this extent is in harmony
with the equitable rule that a liberal construction is to be given to charitable
donations to accomplish the general charitable intent of the donor. The decision in the principal case is sound and would no doubt be followed in all
jurisdictions recognizing, in any form, the cy pres doctrine.
Co:-<STITUTIOXAL LAw-Fix1xc PrucEs FOR SALE oF NECESSARIES t:xnER
LEVER ACT IS DEPRIVIXG OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DuE PROCESS OF LAw.-A

demurrer was filed to a count of an indictment. charging defendants with
violating the provision of the Lever Act making it unlawful to make any
unjust charges in dealing with necessaries, on the ground that the provision
contravenes the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Held, that
the provision takes property without due process of law, and is therefore
unconstitutional. United States v. Bernstein (Neb., D. C., 1920), 26i Fed. 29').
The argument of the court may be briefly summarized as follows: In
the first place, thr validity of war measures, however desirable, must stancl
the test of constitutional limitations, and cannot be sustained if rights guaranteed by the fundamental law are infringed thereby. Secondly, the value
of an individual citizen's property right, in such neces~aries as he deals in,
is derived almost entirely from his right to sell freely, according to the
course of trade and commerce. An incident of such trade and commerce
between individuals is the fixing of a price. Finally, a law which makes it
a crime for a man to sell his private property, not clothed with a public
interest, for the best price he can get in the ordinary course of trade and
commerce, cannot be sustained, while the Constitution forbids the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation, and insures th:.tt
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Obviously, the court overlooked the only real point in the case when it
assumed with delightful naivete that it was dealing with property wholly
unaffected with any public interest. If necessaries of life are not "clothed
with a public interest" the argument is unimpeachable hut too elenrentary
to necessitate any discussion. If, on the other hand, the business of dealing
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in necessaries may be said 10 be clothed with a public interest, the argument
advanced 'by the court is wholly inapplicable. It is almost inconceivable that
a supposedly intelligent court should decide a case of this sort without even
considering the possibility of the business of handling necessaries being
affected with a public interest, in time of war at least. The only possible
explanation would seem to be that the court has become impressed with the
reasoning of the often-rejected dissenting opinions, in Munn v. Illinois, Q4
U. S. u3, and its successors, including German Alliance Ins Co. v. Lewis,
233 U. S. 389, in which it has been contended that a "public interest" is
impossible apart from a public use. The contrary has been held so often
by the Supreme Court of the United States that this view can scarcely be
seriously considered at the present time. For a further discussion of the
circumstances under which businesses and property may be said to be
"affected with a public interest,'' see 19 M1cH. L. Rtv. 74. See also Weed
& Co. v. Lockwood (C. C. A., 2nd Circuit, 1920), 266 Fed. 785, infra, holding
contra to the principal case.

CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-Is PROVISION oF Lr:vn Ar:r MAKING UNREASONABLE CHARGES FOR NECESSARIES UNLAWFUL VIOLATION oF SIXTH A:r.rr:NnMEN'l"
TO FEDERAL CONSTITUTION ?-A provision of the Lever A.ct makes it unlawful
for any person wilfully to make any unjust or um:easonable charge in handling or dealing in necessaries, and provides a penalty of a fine and -imprisonment for its violation. A demurrer was filed to an indictment under this
provision on the ground that it violates the ·Sixth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution providing that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
inasmuch as no standard is established whereby a person can determine in
advance what specific acts will be held to be criminal. Held, the provision
is void. United States v. Bernstein (Neb., D. C., 1920), 267 Fea. 295. On
a bill to restrain the United States district attorney from proceeding on a
similar indictment, held, the provision is valid. JVeed & Co. v. Lockwood
(C. C. A., 2nd Cir., 1920), 266 Fed. 785.
Loi&isville & N. R. Co. v. R.R. Comm. of Temi., 19 Fed. 679; Lo11isz1ille
& N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132, and Tozer v. U. S., 52 Fed. 917,
are cited in support of the first principal case. In none of these cases was
the objection made that the particular statute involved violated the Sixth
Amendment. The first two cases were quasi-criminal actions to recover
penalties for violations of statutes making unjust discriminations and the
charging of unreasonable rates unlawful. In the first of these the statute
was declared void, apparently on the ground that it was a delegation to the
jury of the law-making power. In the Kentucky case the objection was
made and upheld that the failure to provide a standard of conduct violates
"due process." The T-0zer case seems to rest solely upon a statement by
] ustice Brewer to the effect that persons are entitled to know in advance
whether or not particular acts constitute crimes. See also U." S. v. Caflital
Traction Co., 34 App. (D. C.) 592; Czarra v. Board of Medical Exami~ers,
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25 App. (D. C.) 443. In all of these cases the point stressed particularly is
that a contrary holding would make the question as to whether specific acts
constitute crimes entirely dependent upon the whims of juries, and that uniformity would be impossible.. The court in the first principal case admits
that "it must be conceded that many generic, broad descriptions have becoma
definite ~d are upheld and enforced, and it is not in all cases easy to determine when an accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,"
but insists that no Supreme Court adjudications conflict with its conclusion
that the Sixth Amendment is contravened, and the law is therefore invalid.
The second principal case points out that practically all common-law crimes
were originally defined by the common opinion of the people, which found
expression in the judgment of juries and courts, and discusses a number of
situations arising in both civil and criminal cases where questions of fact
determining liability or guilt, as the case may be, are determined in accordance with what the jury aeems reasonable. Anti-trust acts making "unfair
competition" and "restraint of trade" unlawful have been objected to, both
in civil and criminal actions, on the ground that these phrases are so indefinite as to violate "due proc.ess." These provisions have been sustained.
Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U.S. I, at 6g; U.S. v. Am. Tobacco Co .. 221
U.S. 106; Sears-Roebuck Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 258 Fed. 301; WatersPierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 2I2 U. S: 86; Nash v. U. S., 229 U. S. 3i3; U. S.
v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 204 Fed. 107; U.S. v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 69i;
U.S. v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578. In Katzman v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. I24,
a statute was held valid making failure on the part of druggists to use reasonable care to satisfy themselves that certain drugs they might sell were
to be used for legitimate purposes a criminal offense, and in State v. Foz,
71 Wash. 185, a statute making unlawful the publishing of matter "which
shall tend to encourage disrespect for law" was objected to as uncertain,
and sustained. Affirmed in Fox v. W aslzir.gton, 236 U. S. 273. To say that
the Sixth Amendment confers the absolute right in all instances to know
in advance whether or not specific acts constitute crimes would extend its
meaning considerably beyond the logical sense of the words used. As Justice Holmes says in Nash v. U. S., s1epra, "* * * the law is full of instances
where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly-that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it-some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong,
not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur
the penalty of death. * * * 'The criterion in such cases is to examine
whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.' I EAST. P. c. 262.'' For note discussing statutes making it an offense to act "unreasonably,'' see 18 MrcH. L. Rl!v.
810, I9 MICH. L. REV. 218.
CoNTRACTS-::'ifUTl'AL PROMISES-MATERIALITY OF BREACH-RIGHT OF
REscISSION-QUESTION OF LAW OR FAcr.-The city agreed to deliver all the
rubbish collected from the streets at fourteen dumps, where the plaintiff was
to load the same upon scows; in return for which he was to have the privi-
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lege of salvaging from the rubbish articles of value. The city having failed
for four months to furnish four of the dumps as specified, the plaintiff elected
to rescind the contract and sued to recover the amount of the bond which
he had posted to 'insure performance. Held (three Justices dissenting), it
was error to allow the jury to find that such failure on the part of the city
was not a substantial breach. Clarke Contracting Co. v. City of New York
(N. Y., 1920), 128 N. E. 241.
It has been settled since the decision of Lord Mansfield in Boone Y. Eyre,
I H. Bl. 273, n., that where mutual promises go to the whole of the consideration on both sides, such promises are conditions precedent, the one to
the other, and breach of one gives the other party the right to rescind the
contract. Hoare v. Rennie, 5 H. & N. 19; Phillips & Colby Const. Co. v.
Seymour, 91 U. S. 646; Dwinel v. Howard, 30 Me. 258; Tool Co. v. Shoe
Machinery Co., 181 Mass. 275. The rule applies as well where there has
been part performance by the party committing the breach as where the contract is entirely executory. Clark v. West, 122 N. Y. S. 380; Hodgkins v.
!ofoulton, 100 Mass. 309; Boyle v:. G1t~•singer, 12 Ind. 273. A case of rescission for breach by the other party is essentially one of failure of consideration, and the question is whether the failure is sufficiently important to excuse
performance by the aggrieved party. Norrington v. Wright, II5 U. S. 1&S;
Morgaii v. McKee, 77 Pa. St. 228; Wiley v. Athol, 150 Mass. 426. The determination of this question depends upon the particular facts of any given
case. Boston Blower Co. v. Brown, 149 Mass. 421. In the principal case the
materiality of the breach was decided as a matter of law, and it was here
that the court divided, the minority being of opinion that the question had
properly been left to the jury. Construction of written contracts, like other
instruments in writing, is a question of law for the court. Aaron v. Telephone Co., 84 Kan. u7. And it is difficult to see why it should not be a
part of such construction to determine whether the failure of consideration
on one side was of sufficient importance to excuse performance of the promise
on the other. See 28 LAW Q. Rsv. 400. Granting the difficulty of the situation as pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Pound, J., and admitting, as
is said in WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 841, that "The test is whether, on the
whole, it is fair to allow damages merely or to excuse performance entirely,"
still no rational ground appears for Siubstituting the opinion of the jury for
that of the court upon a clear question of law.
CoNTRACTS-MUTUAI.ITY.-The plaintiffs agreed to purchase from the
defendant "their entire consumption of vulcanized fibre and insulating papers,
covering a period of one year." On demurrer, held, since the declaration
fails to show whether plaintiff had an established business, and therefore
whether the quantity bargained for was capable of reasonably correct estimate, it is insufficient. American Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co. (Del., 1920), III Atl. 290.
The plaintiff agreed to furnish "the coal that the defendant would want
to buy of the plaintiff" for a certain period, at fixed price, etc. Held, the con-
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tract was· void for lack of mutuality of obligation. Wickham & Burton Coal
Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co. (Iowa, 1920), 179 N. W. 417.
It is unfortunate that there should be the confusion and diversity that
is found in· the authorities as. to the validity of so convenient and common
a type of contract as those here involved. The trouble arises from the failure of so~e courts to realize that there is, of the three used. but one true
criterion by which to test such agreements. namely, the presence of consideration. The test should not be for mutuality, nor for certainty and definiteness. 'While these ordinarily accompany and indicate consideration, they
are not indispensable. There is clear-cut, carefully reasoned authority, both
early and recent, for this view. L'Amoreux v. Gould, 7 N. Y. 349; Jenkins &
Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958; Ramey Lumber Co. v. John Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39; Bartlett Springs Co. v. Standard Box Co., 16
Calif. App. 671. But decisions put on the unsatisfactory basis of mutuality
and certainty are numerous. Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535, is still cited.
In Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co,, 254 Ill. 215, it was held
'that an · agreement by the brewery to furnish beer to satisfy the bottling
company's demand was void .for lack of mutuality and certainty. In contrast to the holding of the court in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. 0. T. O'Bamum
& Co., 164 Ky. 34, that a contract to furnish all the ties the vendor "coul<l
deliver" was good, we have the decision in H11dson v. Browning, 264 Mo. 58,
decided the same year, that a contract to furnish all the ties ''his time, money
and effort would permit," was void. See 13 MICH. L. REV. 682. Whether
there is c,onsideration in a given case must, of course, depend on the facts
thereof and the intention of the parties as it can be interpreted from the
words they used. If performance as promised by either is dependent merely
upon his wish, whim, desire, convenience, etc., it is illusory and is not sufficient consideration for another promise; but if the promise is to buy of
the other and no one else, to buy of that other his business wants, needs, or
requirements for a certain time, it may well be a substantial promi§e arid
therefore good consideration. See Wn.LISTON ON CONTRACTS, Vol. I, 314, 315.
Giving up one's legal right to buy elsewhere is sufficient conside.ration,
although one has no established business upon which to base a "reasonably
correct estimate." Bartlett Springs Co. v. Sta11dard Box Co., supra. It
would seem that consideration could easily have been found in the Delaware case noted above. The Iowa case is probably right in result, not
because there was no mutuality of obligation, but for the reason that such
a promise is insufficient as conRideration. See 12 :MrcH. L. Ri>v. 677, for a
discussion of this type of contra~t as applied to automobile agency agreements, and also 18 MICH L. Ri>v. 409, especially for interpretation of the worn
"requirements."
CoNTRACTS-0FFER AND ACCEPTANCE-SILENCE-STATUTORY PROVISION AS
ro INSURANCE POLICY.-A North Dakota statute (Sec. 4902, C. L. 1913) provides that "Every insurance company engaged in the business of insuring
against loss by hail * * * shall be bound, and the insurani;e shall take effect
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from and after twenty-four hours from the day and hour the application for
such insurance has been taken by the authorized local agent of said company," etc. Plaintiff signed and placed in the hands of a local agent ci
defendant an appli.cation for insurance against hail and certain other risks,
the application providing that the insurance should take effect from the day
of its receipt and acceptance, "as evidenced by the issuance of a policy
thereon,'' at an agency of the company some distance from the location of
the local agent. While plaintiff's application was in transit to the designated
agency there was a loss by hail, and defendant, apparently without knowledge of such "toss, rejected the application. In an action to recover the insurance, held, the statute is valid and defendant liable. Wanberg v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. (N. Dak., 1920), 179 N. W. 666.
Since an offer creates in the offeree a power by acceptance to enter into
a contractual relation with the offeror, it would seem logically sound that if
the offeror chooses so to mould the power that acceptance may be manifested
by silence or inaction, such silenc~ or inaction should be sufficient to amount
to acceptance. Of course, silence and inaction are equivocal, but under the
circumstances stated it should be deemed logically possible to have acceptance evidenced thereby, and there are many ·such cases in the field of unilateral contracts where the act on the part of the offeree was inaction. See
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 135· ·where the offer contemplates a bilateral
contract, a counter promise by the offeree, or an unilateral contract in which
the promise is on the side of the offeree, as a practical matter it is easy to
see how a court might look upon the situation somewhat differently. \Vhile
a court might not be unwilling to conclude that silence or inaction may
amount to acceptance whereby the acceptor merely acquires rights, unquestionably as a practical matter more hesitmcy would be shown if such acceptance were also to impose liabilities. There may be situations in which there
is clearly a duty on the part of the offeree to act, so that a failure to act
may sufficiently show acceptance. iVheeler v. Klaholt, 178 Mass. 141; Garst
v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72; A11stin \'. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286; Turner v.
Maclzille & F. Co., 97 Mich. 166. So in the case of silence, there may lnve
been under the circumstances a dnty to speak so that a failure to do so will
amount to an acceptance. In the principal case the statute seems to haYe
created such duty. Whether the time allowed therein was not so short as
to make the statute invalid may be seriously questioned. Prescott v. Jm•-!s,
6g N. H. 305; Rosal Jns11ra11ce Co. v. Beatty n9 Pa. St. 6; Hobbs v. H'hit
Co., 158 Mass. 194; Grice v. Noble, 59 Mich. 515, are instances of mere silence
not amountin'! to acceptance.
CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS UNDF.R A STATUTE MAKING
THEM LIABLE FOR "DEBTS" DOES NOT INCLUDE LIABILITY FOR ToRTS.-ln a suit
on a judgment against a corporation for the wrongful taking of ore from
plaintiff's property brought against a shareholder of the corporation under
a statute providing that each stockholder shall be personally and individually liable for the "debts" of a corporation to the extent of his unpaid
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stock, it was held that "debts" does not include the liability of a corporation for a tort, and that even when the claim is reduced to judgment the
shareholder may go behind it and show that the claim is not recoverable
under the statute. Clinton lv!~ning & 11-iineral Co. v. Beacom (July 3, 1920),
266 Fed. 621.
'l'he r~asoning of the decision is put upon the basis that since this statute
is an increase of the common law liability of the stockholder, and since a
number of terms of clearly defined legal meanings are used in the statute,
the intent of the makers was that a stdct construction should be applied,
and the technical meaning of debt as a "sum certain" or "liability arising out
of contract" should be adopted. Since the injury for which judgment
had been given against the corporation was for a tort, this was not an obligation that the corporation could legally incur, and, it is argued, the statutemakers could not have intended· to hold shareholders for debts they could
not have conceived the corporation incurring at the time they entered a contract relation in becoming subscribers for stock. While it is true that no
presumption may be raised that the stockholder contracted with reference
to the commission. of any ultra -;,•ires acts on the part of the corporation, it
is certainly true that the intent of the statute is to be remedial and to prevent
shareholders from escaping by means of the corporate fiction from just such
illegal or tortious acts. As to the party injured, the shareholders, to the
amount of their unpaid stock, certainly appear in the light of responsible parties. That the above technical construction of such statutes increasing the
common l_aw liability of stockholders has not always been followed appears
in the view of Judge Story in the early case of Carver v. Braintree, 2 Story
(U. S. C. C.) 432, in which he holds that "debts contracted" may be construed as "liabilities incurred" and should include all cases of claims, whether
liquidated or unliquidated, arising either ex clelictit or ex contractu. This
hroad stand has since been disapproved in numerous cases. Doolittle v.
Marsh, I I Neb. 243, 9 N. W. 54; Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58; Cao/;!
v. McCime, 72 Am. Dec. 2r4. For other cases of this type, see 22 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 256. But in Cohen v. Ja·y G1111 Mfg. Co., 185 Mo. App. 330, the court
holds, in construing a statute almost identical with that in the principal case,
that a judgment, whether founded on tort or contract liability, is a "debt,"
and a recovery may be had therefor under such a statute. The expression,
"debts unpaid," has been considered sufficient to include the obligation of
a corporation to pay for co:il illegally mined and to hold the stockholders or
the offending corporation for its value. Abernathy v. Loftus, 87 ¥..an. 95.
"Dues" has' usually been held to include liability for tort judgments, in cases
of remedial statutes. Henley v. Me·yers, 76 Kan. 723. While the more elastic
phrase, "debts and liabilities:," is generally construed to meant tort liabilities
as well as those of contract.
DAMAGES-MEASURE OF, "WHEN INJURY IS CAUSED BY A "P.ERMANEN'r

STRUCTURE."-The defendant so built its railway as to flood 56 acres of the
plaintiff's 138-acre farm. There was a suit and recovery for this. The cause
of action as alleged was based on the building of the grade and the erection
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of pilings. In the instant case a further recovery was sought for damages
caused by the "improper construction of the defendant's track." It was held,
that since the plaintiff had elected to treat his first suit as a vehicle for recovery for permanent injury, thus obtaining payment on the basis that the
value of the farm had been impaired for all time, he was "estopped" to bring
suit for subsequently accruing damages to a crop. Thompson v. Ill. Central
Ry. Co. (Iowa, 1920), 179 N. W. 191.
The court argued that there was not any distinction in the two causes
of action alleged but even admitting that there was such a distinction, nevertheless "the naked fact that a third means for producing these results was
for the first time urged in the second suit will not make the first suit less
effective as an estoppel than if all three means that caused the injury had
been named in both suits." It was decided in Stodgill v. Chicago Railroad,
(I88o), 53 Iowa 341, that a railroad was a "permanent structure." In Bennett
v. City of Marion, (I903), II9 Iowa 473, it was held that a sewer system was
not a "permanent structure.'' In Uline v. Ry., (I886), IOI N. Y. g8, it was
held that a railway embankment was not a "permanent structure." It is generally admitted that for an injury caused by a "permanent structure" the
measure of damages is the permanent d·epreciation in the value of the land,
and that there cannot be successive suits for successive losses. Chicago Ry.
v. Loeb, (I884), n8 Ill. 203; Highland A. Ry. Co. v. Mathews, (I892), 99
Ala. 24; Jacksonville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lockwood, (1894), 33 Fla. 573; Allen
v. Macon D. and S. Ry. Co., (1899), 107 Ga. 838. The argument in the instant case seems to turn on the distinction between (1) a "permanent structure" causing a nuisance, and (2) a structure which, although in itself "permanent", "may or may not be injurious" in the future. In (I) it is admitted,
as stated above, that there can be but one recovery, although the structure
causes repeated losses-the recovery being for permanent depreciation. See
cases cited supra. If "permanent structure" :is used as in (2), then the recovery in the first suit is limited to the loss occurring before the trial, and
successive suits may be brought for recurring injuries. Carl v. Sheboygaii
Ry. Co. (1879), 46 Wis. 625; Har111011 v. Railroad, (188g), 87 Tenn. 614;
Savamiah Ry. Co. v. Bourquin, (1874), 51 Ga. 378; Railroad v. Biggs, (IS89),
52 Ark. 240; Ca11al Corporatio1i v. Hitchings, (1876), 65 Me. I40; Troy v. Ry.
Co., 3 Foster, (N. H.), 83. See also the Harvey Case, (Igo6), I29 Iowa, 465,
a leading case reviewing many of the authorities. The court in the instant
case held that since the trial court in the first suit adopted (I), the plaintiff
in this suit was "estopped", as it said, from resorting to (2). The failure of
the courts to distinguish between these two theories is the cause of much
confusion in the decisions. The instant case illustrates very well how such
confusion may arise. After the case is properly placed in either of the two
above categories it is easy to apply the governing principles, which are simple
and well settled.
DEEDS-DELIVERY IN EscROW TO GRAN'.l'EE.-P delivered a contract under
seal to purchase land of D, but delivery was made conditional upon D obtaining an amendment to a bank charter. D, though unable to obtain the amendment, nevertheless started a suit at law to recover the purchase money under
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the contract. P brought the present action to restrain the suits at law. Held,
for P, for a sealed instrument absolute on its face may be shown to have been
delivered conditionally to the grantee by parol evidence. Whitaker v. Lane,
(Va., 1920),. 104 S. E. 252.
This case is illustrative o{ a tendency on the part of the American courts
to depart from the rule announ~ed in Whyddon's Case, Cro. Eliz. 520, that a
delivery to the grantee in escrow, "let the form of the words be what they
may, is absolute and the deed shall take effect as his deed presently", SHEPHERD'S TOUCHSTONE, § 59. The former cases in Virginia had abided by the
old rule, but the principal case, after an exhaustive review of the authorities,
discards it as being suited only to the formalism. of the medieval mind. The
problem involved was discussed in 18 MICH. L. Rsv. 314, where a similar conclusion was reached. In Wipf/er v. Wipf/er, 153 Mich. 18, the Michigan
Supreme Court followed the old. rule with great. reluctance, but in Phillips
v. Farmers I11.s11rai1ce Co., 175 N. W. 144, commented upon in 18 M1cH. L.
REv. 425, a conclusion was reached which is difficult to reconcile with the
principle announced in the earlier case. That the vast weight of authority
in America still remains in f<1:vor of the rule laid down in T17hyddon's Case
cannot admit of a doubt, (16 L. R. A. N. S. 940), but where the evidence i5
clear no good reason readily comes to mind why, as between the parties to
the deed, the principal case should not be followed.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-EFFECT OF STATUTE DISINHERITING ONE
CoNVIC'l'ED or KILLING HIS ANCES'l'OR.-Husband and wife were living in
Kansas. Husband owned land in Oklahoma. Wife was convicted in Kansas
of manslaughter for the killing of husband. Wife brought suit in the Federal Court against the daughter claiming a share of the husband's land in
Oklahoma. The Oklahoma statute provided that "no person who is convicted of having taken or causes or procures another so to take, the life of
another, shall inherit from such person, or receive any interest in the estate
of the decedent, or take by devise or legacy, or descent or distribution, from
him, or her, any portion of his or her, estate." There was also a statute in
Kansas similar in all material respects to the one just quoted. Held, that the
Kansas statute is a law of inheritance, not a law :fixing the status of persons
domiciled within the state, and therefore cannot control inheritance as to
lands in Oklahoma; and that the Oklahoma statute disqualifies a person from
inheriting only on convfation in the courts of that state, so that the wife,
convicted in Kansas, can inherit an interest in the husband's lands located in
Oklahoma. Harriso1i v. Moncravie, (July, 1920), 264 Fed. 776.
There is some. conflict in the cases on the question whether a murderer
can acquire, by descent or distribution, the title to the property of his victim
and keep it. In Riggs v. Palmer, II5 N. Y. 5o6, a beneficiary under a.will had
murdered the testator in order to prevent him from revoking the will and
it was held that the beneficiary, by reason of the crime committed by him,
was deprived of any interest in the estate left by the victim, and so was not
entitled to the property, either as donee under the will or as heir or next of
kin. In the later case of Ellis01i v. Wescott, 148 N. Y. I49, the court ex-
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plained Riggs v. Palm.er (supra), by saying that the decision must not be
interpreted to mean that the will was revoked by the crime, but that the
devisee got the legal title, although Equity would enjoin him from taking ariy
benefit under it. Iii other words the court would declare the murderer a constructive trustee for the benefit of the heir or next of kin. See AMES, Li>c'rURES ON LEGAL His'l'ORY, 310. In the Estate of Hall, [1914], P. l, a legatee
who was found guilty of manslaughter for killing of testator was held not to
be entitled to take property under the will of his victim. Also in Lundy v.
Lmu!y, 24 Can. Sup. Ct. 650, and Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, the murderer was held not entitled to take the property of his victim. The ground
of these decisions, as stated by the court in Riggs v. Palmer (supra), is that
"no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong, or to found any claim
upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime." In other
jurisdictions, however, the slayer has been allowed to take and keep the
property of his victim. See Owms v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240; Carpmter's
Estate, 170 Pa. 203; McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kans. 533; De Graffcnreid v. Iowa
Land and Trust Co., 20 Okla. 687; Halloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. l. Subsequent to the two latter decisions, the legislature of Oklahoma enacted' the
statute quoted in the principle case with the obvious purpose of correcting the
rule of those decisions. The decision in the principal case on the Kansas
statute is sound, as that statute applies only to Kansas land, and is an inheritance statute, rather than one defining capacity. The decision of the case
rests upon the construction of the Oklahoma statute, and, unfortunate as the
result may be, it is submitted that the decision is sound. It was argued that
the conviction by the court of her own domicile fixed her status and disqualified her as an heir of the land of her husband in Oklahoma. The following analogies might be invoked to support this conclusion : the adoption
cases (Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. Z43), although the court distinguishes this class
of cases; the divorcee's dower cases (Rendleman v. Rendleman, nS Ill. 257;
Hawkins v. Ragsdale, 80 Ky. 353), no doubt distinguishable for similar reasons. It is certainly the general rule that statutes such as the one in the
principal case are territorial only. For example, a statute declaring that a
person who has been conv)cted of a felony is incompetent as a witness does
not apply to a conviction in another state; it has reference only to a conviction in that state. Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466; Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263.
The decision in the principal case indicates that statutes of this type, which
have been made necessary by an erroneous decision on the constructive trust
question, should be made broad enough in their terms to apply beyond peradventure to convictions anywhere.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYE-PtRSUADlNG ONE 'rO DISCHARGE AND NO'l'
EMPLOY ANO'l'HER.-Under a rule of an association of traders that "on an
employe leaving an employer, who is a member of the association, the employer shall report the same to the secretary, who shall advise all the members, and no other member shall employ or supply him for twelve months",
after a meeting of the members, the plaintiff's employer was persuaded to
discharE<e the plaintiff from his employment. In an· action against the officials
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the association for damages and an injunction to restrain them from intertering with him in his calling, held, upon the facts of the case the plaintiff
had no cause of action, since his dismissal was not obtained by any illegal
means.. Davies v. Thomas, [1920], 2 Ch. 189.
The right to be employed ·i~ a property right for a wrongful interference
with which there is a right of action. This is an accepted doctrine, but the
courts disagree as to what constitutes wrongful interference. The principal
case was decided by a direct application of the principle of Allen v. Flood,
[1898], A. G l, 62 J. P. 595, which has become the rule in England. Where
the act of procuring another's dismissal is lawful in itself, said the court "in
this leading case, the motive with which it is done is immaterial. The position of the court is seemingly based on the argument that it cannot be unlawful to persuade one to do what he has a perfect rig-ht to do. Later English
cases seem to say that such inter.ference is actionable if it is done "without
justification or excuse" or illegal means are used. Quinn v. Leathem, [1901],
A. C. 495, 85 L. T. N. S. 289; Gib/an v. National Amalgamated Union, [1903J,
K. B. 600. American courts are divided on what amounts to wrongful interference or illegal means. Some hold that merely advising or inducing an
employer to discharge a worker is not unlawful, irrespective of the existence
of an evil inte~t, thus following Allen v. Flood (S1tpra). Holden v. Cannon
Mfg. Co., 138 N. C. 3o8, 50 S. E. 681; Bon.>all v. Reagan, 7 Del. Co. Rep. 545.
Another gro.up of American courts, leaning towards the Q1tinn v. Leathem
doctrine, hold that even mere persuasion, where employed for the purpose of
interfering with another's actual or prospective employment, is prima facie
an invasion of such other's legal rights, whicb must be justified by showing
that it was employed in the exercise of an equal or superior right. Moran
v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 482, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass.
353; Brennan v. United Hatters of North Aw.-erica, 73 N. J. Law 729. This
latter rule has been applied especially in the case of interference by labor
unions. After all, though, whether the interference is wrongful or not must
necessarily depend on the special facts in each particular case. The opinions
both in Allen v. Flood (supra) and in the instant case show that the judges
went upon the specific facts involved in determining whether legitimate persuasion or coercion, intimidation or undue influence were used in securing
the discharge of the worker. It is all a matter of fact: what may seem on
the surface legitimate persuasion may in truth, under the circumstances,
amount to coercion and _intimidation. Hushie v. Griffi1i, 75 N. H. 345, 74 Atl.
595. Again, what may appear to be coercion may in fact be a justifiable interference, .considering the interests involved. It may depend also on "the
eye of the beholder". Not all of the judges in Alleii v. Flood (S1epra) were
agreed that the interference there was lawful, and many a person might on
the facts of the principal case find an element of threat and coercion lurking
in the background of the peaceful meeting at which the employer was "persuaded" to discharge the plaintiff here. As one judge in Quinn v. Leathem
(supra) put it: "The doctrine of Allen v. Flood can be carried' so far as to
make the most objectionable act lawful". We must consider all the facts and
interests involved. The soft ·"persuasion" of the labor union's representative
01
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is often backed by the silent threat of a strike. Although some American
cases declare· that the tendency is to limit the rule of Allm v. Flood to acts
of an individual (Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Moulder's Union, 150 Fed. 155).
the instant case draws no difference between inducements by individuals and
by combinations, except that it says "it is much easier to infer pressure or
coercion in the case of a number of persons."
Evm~Nc~-Bunm~N oF PR00F-R!c~1P'l' IN FuI.L.-In an action to recover
the balance due on goods sold to the defendant by the plaintiff, the former
pleaded payment and set out in his answer a receipt in full given by the plaintiff and a letter acknowledging full payment of the indebtedness. The plaintiff filed a reply alleging that the receipt was given and the letter written
through mistake, and that payment had not in fact been made. Held, the
burden of proving payment rests upon the defendant, and this burden is not
shifted or affected by the affirmative allegations of the plaintiff that a mistake had been made in giving the receipt and in writing the letter. Illinois
Steel Bridge Co. v. Wayland, (Kans., 1920), 1!)2 Pac. 752.
The term "burden of proof" in civil cases is frequently used to signify
two wholly different duties: first, the duty incumbent upon a party to establish by a preponderance of evidence those ultimate facts which he must allege
in order to show his cause of action or his affirmative defense; secondly, the
duty of going fonvard with the evidence in order to prevent a verdict in
favor of the opponent because of the latter's then existing preponderance of
evidence. Authorities generally hold that the party pleading payment has the
burden of proof in the first sense above given, i. e., in order to take advantage of this affirmative defense he must prove by a preponderance of evidence
the ultimate fact of payment as alleged. When a party introduces a receipt
in full as evidence of payment the courts are not in accord as to where the
"burden of proof" lies. Their disagreement is due primarily to two causes:
first, a failure on the part of the courts to designate or define clearly the
sense in which the term "burden of proof" is used; secondly, a difference in
opinion as to the substantive effect of evidence of a receipt in full. Statements are often found that a party attempting to explain or impeach a receipt in full has the "burden of proof", and these seem to be correct when by
"burden of proof" is meant the duty of going forward with evidence in
order to offset the "prima facie" defense of the party pleading payment.
Ramsdell v. Clark, 20 Mont. 103; Guyette v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 228. Some courts,
however, apparently wishing to give a receipt in full exceptional force as
evidence, hold that unless the party disputing the receipt shows by a preponderance of evidence that it is invalid as such, "the receipt must have its
prima facie effect." Levi v. Karrick, 13 Iowa ·344; JVinchester v. Grosvenor,
44 III. 425; Neal v. Handley, n6 Ill. 418. On principle, the latter doctrine is
illogical, since the burden of proof in the sense of a duty to prove the truth
of certain facts is dependent on the allegations properly set up in the pleading and not on matters introduced in evidence. The better rule, followed in
the principal case, is to the effect that one. pleading payment lias the burden
of proving the ultimate fact of payment, and that this burden is not shifted
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by either pleading or introducing evidentiary matter, and this is in accordance
with the elementary principle that the burden of proof is ordinarily determined by the issues properly raised by the pleadings. Mitchell v. Mitchell,
18 Wkly. Note Cas. (Pa.) 439; Shrader v. U. S. Glass Co., 179 Pa. 623;
Terryberry v. Woods, 69 Vt. 94, In the principal case the incorrect pleading
accentuatea the difficulties of placing the "burden of proof". The defendant,
besides setting up the ultimate fact of payment, also pleaded evidentiary
matters, setting out the receipt and the letter acknowledging payment in full.
The plaintiff in his reply, besides denying that the debt was in fact paid,
which raised the real issue in the case, undertook to confess and avoid the
evidentiary matter alleged by the defendant in support of the allegation of
payment. But incorrectly pleading evidentiary matters could not properly
affect the burden of proving the ultimate facts in issue in the case. The
minority opinion fails to distinguish between substantial confession and avoidance of the ultimate fact of payment and a formal confession and avoidance
of evidentiary matters improperly alleged in the answer in support of the
defense.
INCOME TAX-INHERI'.i'ANCE TAX PAID UNDER THE NEW YORK TRANSFER
ACT xs No'.i' DEDUCTIBLE FROM NET INCOME IN CoMPU'.i'ING INCOME TAX
LlABlLI'.i'Y.-Plaintiff sued for the amount overpaid as income tax which
should have been deducted from the amount of the entire tax, in case an
inheritance tax paid on the estate inherited from her father is within the
clause of the act of Congress providing that ·there shall be allowed as deductions from net 'income, "All national, state, county, school, and municipal
taxes, * * *"· Held, however, that a collateral inheritance tax levied under
the laws of the state of New York is paid' for the privilege of transmitting
the property by will, and does not constitute such an item as is allo\vable as
a deduction in the return of the beneficiary thereof. Prentiss v. Eisner,
(June 16, 1920), 267 Fed. 16.
This application of the law of inheritance to the question of income tax
returns brings up the entire subject of the nature of death duties. At common
law no right to will real property existed, and, except as this result was
achieved by means of uses, no such right was exercised until the STATUTE OF
WILLS, (32 Henry VIII). Hence, this right was entirely statutory and subject to any restrictions that legislatures might see fit to impose. Thus all
sorts of inheritance taxes,-legacy taxes, stamp duties, privilege taxes, have
been generally regarded as taxes, not upon the corpus of the property that
has been devised, but upon the right to transmit or receive the property by
devise or will. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747; State v.
Dunlap, 28 Idaho 784, 156 Pac. n41; In re Terry's Estate, 218 N. Y. 218, II2
N. E. 931. For a general treatment see 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 6o6. In the
principal case the particular question is whether the tax is levied upon the
power to transmit or upon the privilege to receive property by devise. If a
tax upon the privilege to receive property by inheritance, then plaintiff, as
recipient of the inheritance, has been taxed and should be able to claim an
exemption, but if the tax is upon the power to transmit, then the tax has been
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paid by the executor and plaintiff can claim no exemption. The principal case
follows the decision of United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct.
ro73, which, in translating a similar statute, decided that such a tax is not a
levy upon property; but is strictly a tax upon the right to dispose of property
by will. The reasoning of the decision is that the statute creates a lien upon
the property at the moment of the testator's death, and the right of -the
legatee extends only to the property remaining after deducting the tax. Matti!r
of Penfold, 2I6 N. Y. I63. That this is the more probable theory of "death
duties" appears from the fact that it was the right to will rather than the
right to receive by will that was granted by statute. I~ general, the
statements of the courts imply that such taxes are upon the "right of succession" but the distinction of the present case has seldom been involved, so
that the statements of the courts characterizing this right are nothing but
dicta. Corvin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, IOI Atl. 834; In re Cupple's Estate,
19') S. W. 556; Walker v. People, - - Colo.--, I7I Pac. 747. See also 33
L. R. A. (N. S.) 6o6. While the majority of the courts that really consider
this point seem to support the principal case, State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho 784,
156 Pac. u41; In re Terry's Estate, 218 N. Y. 218, u2 N. E. 931; In re Watson's Estate, 174 N. Y. 191, a number of ca~es adopt an opposite theory. In
cases involving legacy taxes in contradistinction to general inheritance taxes,
the view is general that the legatee pays the tax rather than the executor,
since any other view would require that all legacy taxes would have to be
paid from the residual estate. Matter of Cihon, 169 N. Y. 443, 63 N. E. 561.
Corvin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, 101 Atl. 834, implies a different view from
that of the principal case in its intimation that jurisdiction of the court for
the payment of general inheritance taxes may be secured by getting jurisdiction of the persons of the legatees. Matter of Cihon, 169 N. Y. 443, 63 N. E.
561, supports the view that the levy is upon the power to receive rather than
upon the power to devise by will. The latest appearance of a doctrine contrary to the principal case is in Henson v. Monday, (Oct. 23, 1920), 224 S. W.
1042, in which the court takes the general stand that the nature of general inheritance taxes of this character is a levy upon the legatee's privilege to
receive rather than a tax upon the power to transmit.
INSURANCr:-ABsoLuTr: PHYSICAL INABILITY NOT Nr:cr:SSARY r'OR "TOT.AI,
D1SABILITY."-It was stipulated in an accident insurance policy that for the
loss of either foot by severance resulting from injury the defendant would
pay a certain specified sum if the injury "shall independently and exclusively
of other causes, immediately, wholly, and continuously disable and prevent
the insured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his
occupation". The plaintiff sought a recovery for the loss of a foot the amputation of which was made necessary by an injury. He claimed compensation
for a certain specified period on the ground of "total disability". The defendant resisted the claim on the ground that the plaintiff, during this certain
period of alleged "total disability", was not "totally" disabled; that he had
made two trips to New York where.he "made an effort" to buy goods, assisted
by his wife. His occupation was stated in the policy as "managet with office
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and traveling duties". Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Clark v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (Vt., 1920), 111 Atl. 449.
It appeared from the evidence in the case that although the plaintiff made
the two trips to New York, he did so without due regard for his health, and
experienced considerable bodily: pain. That being the case, the decision of
the court was not inconsistent with the proposition that an attempt to perform
some of the duties of one's occupation, when such an attempt is an indiscretion or an error of judgment, will not defeat a claim of total disability.
U11ited Casualty Co. v. Perr:yman, 203 Ala. 212. It must also be borne in mind
that the courts in these insurance cases show a tendency to be very liberal
toward the insured and to construe the language of the policy against the
insurer on the ground that he chooses the language of the contract. The instant case is in accord with other authorities on this question of what amounts
to total disability, although in some of the cases the distinction between partial and total disability is very finely drawn. The distinction seems to turn
largely on the clause in the policy defining the application of the indemnity
to the injury and to the occupation, and defining the disability. In the following cases the clauses in the policies were the same as that in the case at bar
and yet a recovery was denieCI; Spicer v. Commercial M11tual Accident Ins.
Co., 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 271; Gracey v. Peoples' 11fot. Accident Ins. Asso., 21
Pitts. L. J. N. S. 25; Ford v. U.S. Mut. Accident Relief Co., 148 Mass. 153;
Bean v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 94 Cal. 581; Knapp v. Preferred Muf!lal Accident
Association, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 84; Stevens v. Peoples' Mutual Accide11t Asso.,
I 50 Pa. 132. In the following cases a recovery was allowed : . Y 01mq v. Trav·
elers' Ins. Co., 8o Me. 244; Baldwin v. Fraternal Accident Ass'tt, 31 Misc. Rep.
124; Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Afutllal Aid Ass'n,
Minn. 14; Turuer v.
Fidelity a11d Casualty Co., II2 Mich. 425. It appears from an examination of
the cases that the courts of last resort are not in complete accord, but the
weight of authority seems to be that the insured is "totally disabled" within
the meaning of the policy if he is nnable, with prudence and a due regard for
his physical welfare, tO perform the substantial and material acts necessary
to carry on his occupation. Even though the insured is able to perform a
few occasional and incidental acts pertaining to his occupation, yet if he is
unable to perform the substantial and material portion of his work he is considered as "totally disabled". See 4 CooLEY's BRIEFS ON INSURANCE, 3290. As
the court in the instant case very well points out, the provision of disability
in such a policy cannot be given a literal construction. If it were given such
a construction the company could always avoid liability unless the insured
lost his life.or reason as a result of the injury, for a man can always transact
some parts of his business if he is possessed of his mental faculties. The
term "total disability" then must be given a reasonable interpretation depending in a great measure upon the circumstances of each particular case. 4
COOLEY'S BRIEFS ON INSURANCE, 3288.
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INTOXICATING LIQUORS-STATUTORY FoRFEITC:RE OF AUTOMOBILE CARRYING
J.IQC:nR-DUE PROCESS.-Ctaimant intrustcd his automobile to his chauffei;r
to take to a garage in \Vashington, D. C. 'l'he chauffeur stole the machine
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and used it illegally to carry liquor in Virginia, where it was seized and forfeited under a Virginia statute (Acts 1918, p. 6!2). Held, the forfeiture was
valid, notwithstanding the owner was unaware of the illegal use of the automobile. Buchholz v. Commonwealth (Va., 1920), 102 S. E. 760.
Two conflicting views stand out in cases involving statutory forfeiture
of chattels for illegal use. The one is that the necessity of the situation
demands a liberal construction of the statutes involved, to the end of giving
efficacy to the law. U. S. v. Stowell, 133 U. S. l; U. S. v. One Saxon Automobile, 257 Fed. 251; U. S. v. Two Bay Mules, 36 Fed. 84. The other view
is that the usual strict construction of criminal statutes should be adhered
to. U. S. v. One Cadillac Eight A.1etomobile, 255 Fed. 173; State v. Davis
(Utah, 1919), 184 Pac. 161. The courts sustaining the former construction
favor the view that such proceedings are in rem, the chattel itself being the
wrongdoer, and that therefore the anfoms of the owner is immaterial. U. S.
v. Two Barrels of Whisky, 96 Fed. 479. But in other instances it has been
considered that the proceedings are criminal in their nature and directed
against the owner of the chattel. Boyd v. U. S., n6 U. S. 6!6. In this
view of the matter, the guilt or innocence of the owner is, of course, controlling. In the principal case the court adopts the liberal view of the statute,
but does not go so far as to declare that the forfeiture would have been
valid had the custody and possession of the machine been taken from the
owner by a thief, without the owner's knowledge. Such was not the fact
in the instant case because, although the chauffeur had stolen the car under
the law of the District of Columbia, still he had originally been entrusted
with the custody by the owner, who thereby assumed the risk of subsequent
illegal operation. It has been held that such statutes as the one here in
question do not effect a taking of property without due process of law, but
are within the police power of the state, provided the parties interested are
given notice and have an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding.
Ka11sas v. Ziebold, 123 U. S. 623. The justification for the holding in the
tirincipal case, which is unquestionably harsh, would seem to lie in the apparent inability to meet a situation of great public concern otherwise than by
sanctioning hardship in certain individual cases in the interest of the great•:r
public welfare.
).!oRTGAG:Es-CoNVEYANCS SunJ:ECT To MoRTGAGE--ExT:ENSJON oF T1M:E To
GRANTES-MSASURE OF D1scHARGE.-Mortgagor conveyed premises to grantet>,
who took subject to the mortgage. Mortgagee extended time to grantee hy
agreement without consent of the mortgagor. In a suit for foreclosure,
held, the mortgagor as a surety is completely released from personal liability.
regardless_ of the value of the land, and the mortgagee cannot recover a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor. Braun v. Crew et ux-. (Cal., 1920),
192 Pac. 531.
When, upon conveyance of the mortgaged premises, the grantee of the
mortgagor assumes payment of the mortgage, the grantee becomes personally liable for the whole debt, Johns v. Wilson, 180 U. S. 440; and as is
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often said, becomes the principal debtor, and the mortgagor a surety for
that debt. George v. Andrews, 60 Md. 26; Poe v. Di~on, 6o Ohio St. 12.i.
As in other cases of suretyship, an extension of time made by the mortgageecreditor to . the grantee-principal, without the consent of the mortgagorsurety, will release the mo"rti.igor. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford,
143 U. S. ·187. And this release is complete from all liability for any of the
mortgage debt. Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 2II. On the other hand, when
the grantee does not assume the mortgage debt, but takes the premises subject to the mortga~e, he is under no personal liability for that debt. Elliol
v. Sac/~ett, 1o8 U.S. 132; Fiske v. Tolman, 124 Mass. 254; Metropolitan Bank
v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436. In such a case the land remains
liable, and becomes, moreover, the primary fund for the payment of the debt.
McNaughton v. Burke, 63 Neb. 704; Lumka v. Dot!11elly, 163 fa. 255. Even
here the land is considered the principal debtor and the mortgagor becomes
the surety for the payment of the mortgage debt. with all the incidents and
equities of a surety, Sime v. Lewis, n2 Minn. 403; or at least a quasi-surety.
Gottschalk v. lungma1m, 79 N. Y. Supp. 551. But clearly the mortgagor is
a surety only up to the value 9f the land ; beyond this he is still the piincipal
debtor. Travers v. Dorr, 6o Minn. 173; Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 6u.
Applying the doctrine of suretyship, that an extension of time given by the
creditor to the principal without the consent of the surety discharges the
surety, the mortgagor is discharged by an extension given to the grantee by
the mortgagee. Metzger v. Nova Really Co., 214 N. Y. 26; Travers v. Dorr,
supra; M~rray v. Marshall, StlPra. But this release is only to the extent that
the mortgagor is a surety, the value of the land at the time of the release.
Spencer v. Spencer, 95 N. Y. 353; Bunnell v. Carter, 14 Utah 100. Refusing
to extend the release this far, the court in North End Savings Bank v. Snow,
197 Mass. 339, states the rule to be that the release is only for the amount
to which, by reason of the extension, the security falls short of the sum due
on the note. In the principal case the court applied a statute providing in
substance that if the creditor impairs or suspends his remedies or rights
against the principal the surety is completely exonerated. The question
whether or not this statute was but merely declaratory of the common law
was not considered by the court. It is submitted that there was a ·misapplication of the statute and an extension of it far beyond its proper scope. The
~ourt ignored the rule so aptly stated in Murray v. Marshall, supra, that the
mortgagor can be discharged only so far as he is a surety; he holds that
position only up to the value of the land, and beyond that is still the· principal debtor without any remaining equities.

ACT BF.YOND BouNnARIF.s
EMPowF.RF.n.-A tax district, bordering on fue water front, had
power given by statute to make improvements "within the district." It was
proposed to create a park, including a pleasure pier, 50 feet of which was to
lie within the boundaries of the district and to extend 750 feet beyond the
exterior boundary lines of the district into the ocean. A. taxpayer seeks to
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONs-MuN1c1PALlTY CAN
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cn1om the issuance of bonds for such purpose. Held, that an injunction
should be granted on the ground that a municipality is competent to act
beyond its boundaries only in cases in which it is so empowered by legislative authority, or where the urgency of extrinsic expediency or necessity
demand. Mulville v. City of San Diego (Cal., 1920), 192 Pac. 7o:i.
The statute in the present case gave the district no authority to act
beyond its boundaries. Since a municipal corporation is an agency of the
state for local government, it is as a general rule restricted to its corporate
limits in the exercise of its corporate powers. Coor.EY ON MuNICIPAI. CoRPORATIONS, 139; Houghton v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 57 Mich. 547; Sweitzer v. Harrisburg, 104 Va. 533. The taxing power of a municipality does not
extend beyond its boundaries. Gilchrist's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 6oo. The corporation boundaries usually mark the limit for the exercise of the police power
by the municipality. COOLEY ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 314; Gess v. Corporation of Greenville, 36 Tenn. 62. Where the municipality has power to construct a sewer it may, as an implied incident to such power, extend the sewer
beyond its boundaries when necessary or manifestly desirable. Coldwater v.
Tucker, 36 Mich. 474; Shreve v. Town of Cicero, 129 Ill. 226; Cochran v. Village of Park Ridge, 138 Ill. 295. In the case last cited the court said that a
sewer extending outside the corporate limits was for the improvement and
benefit of the municipality alone, and being here necessary to the municipality
it was held to be a municipal improvement. Should such an argument be
applied to the principal case, it would seem that the construction of the pier
was not an improvement; of the ocean, but was for the benefit of the municipality; inasmuch as the district was created for a pleasure resort, it migh!
also be said to be a necessary improvement. Dillon is of the opinion that
there are purposes for which a corporation may, without special grant, purchase and hold extra-territorial !ands, as for a pest-house, cemetery, park,
and like objects of municipal character. 3 DII.r.oN ON MuNIC'IPAI. CORPORATIONS [5th Ed.], 1567. The Wisconsin court has held that a municipality
may maintain and operate a stone quarry outside of the city limits for municipal purposes. A classification that is given in this case appears to reconcile
the many varied decisions better than any other that has been suggested. The
distinction is that municipal authority in a governmental sense cannot be
exercised outside the limits of the municipality: while municipal authority
used in the mere exercise of a business function can be exercised outside of
the limits of the municipality, providing such function comes within the
scope of the city's corporate authority. Schneider v. Cit'J' of Menasha, nB
Wis. 298. On the basis of the above distinction, it would appea~ that the
principal case might well have been decided differently.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-UNDERTAKING ESTABLISHMENTS MAY 11:r,: CONTROLLED AND PROHIBITED UNDER POLICE Powr:R.-In an action brought by the
proprietor of an undertaking establishment to enjoin the enforcement of an
ordinance prohibiting the locating of such establishments outside of certain
zones, held, the injunction must be denied because this ordinance comes
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within the well-recognized police power of the ·state, inasmuch as one of the
purposes of the organization of our government is to secure to men the
"inalienable right" of "pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Broum
v. City of Los Angeles (Cal., 1920), 192 Pac. 716.
The P.Olice power of the .state is that inherent or plenary power which
enables the state to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society, and may be termed "the law of overruling necessity."
Town of Lake View v. Roselzill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191. Anything which
is hurtful to the public interest is subject to t?le police power, and may be
restrained or prohibited in the exercise of that power: Harmon v. City of
Chicago, IIO Ill. 400. Municipalities are allowed a greater degree of legisla_tion in this direction than in any other. Gmzdling v. City of Chicago, 176
Ill. 340. An ordinance for the preservation of the public health, prohibiting
the interment of dead human bodies within specified limits of a city, is valid.
Austin v. Austin Cit3• Cemetery Associaticn, 87 Tex. 330. A city can regulate hospitals for the insane under its police power because this is for the
protection of the public health and safety. Billboard regulations that protect public safety, health and morals are valid, but those regulations that arc
made only for aesthetic purposes are invalid. C01n. v. Boston Advci·tisi1ig
Co., 188 l\lass. 348. Chicago v. Gm111i11g System, 214 Ill. 628. There seems
to be little doubt that the right to secure to men the "inalienable right" of
"pursuing and obtaining safety .and happiness" would, from the public point
of view, include the right to prevent nuisances. An undertaking establishment is n.ot a nuisance per se. But there are numerous businesses not nuisances per se that a city can exclude from residential districts because of
their proneness to become injurious to health, offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of properly. Cit3• of St. Paul v. Kessler
(Minn.), 178 N. W. 171. Lord Hardwicke's view in Anonymous, 3 Atk.
750, that the fears of mankind, though they may be reasonable ones, will not
create a nuisance, is widely disputed. Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86. In
Beissel v. Crosby (Neb.), 178 N. W. 272, the court held that an undertaking
establishment was a nuisance that could be enjoined. An undertaking establishment may be enjoined as a nuisance where it appears that noxious odors
and gases will permeate the neighborhood. In. the recent case of City of
St. Paul v. Kessler, s11pra, the court held that an ordinance prohibiting funeral
homes in residence districts was valid under the police power expressly
given in the city's charter. See 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 191; 13 MrcH. L. REv. 169.
NEGLIGENCE-CONCURRENT Acrs-EFFICJENT INTERVENING CAUSE.-Where
the defendant negligently allowed his sidewalk elevator to remain unguarded
and a third person negligently operated it, injuring the plaintiff, it was held
that the act of the third person was not legally an efficient intervening cause.
Roscnholz v. Frank G. Slzatf11ck Co. (N. Y., 1920), 183 N. Y. S. 23.
It is universally settled that if the concurrent or successive negligence
of two persons, combined together, results in an injury to a third person,
he may recover damages of either or both, and neither. can interpose the
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defense that the prior or concurrent negligence of the other contributed to
the injury. Ry. Co. v. Callaghan, 56 Fed.· g88; La11e v. Atlantic Works, 107
Mass. 104; Weik v. Lander, Admr., 75 Ill. 93; Johnson v. Northwest Tel.
Exch. Co., 48 Minn. 433. See also 1 TROMP. N-ec. [2nd ed.], Sec. 75, and
cases there cited. As a test of concurrence many courts lay down that if
the injury could not have happened in the absence of either the defendant's
negligence or that of the third person, then the two are concurrent causes.
Quill v. Ry. Co., I I N. Y. S. So, aff. 126 N. Y. 629; Pastene v. Adams, 49
Cal. 87; Martin v. Iron Works, 31 Minn. 407; Mahar v. Steuer, 170 Mass.
454; Go11zales v. City of Galveston, 84 Tex. 3; S11ydor v. Arnold, 122 Ky. 557.
As stated by the court in Johnson v. Northwest Tel. Exch. Co., supra, "The
negligence of each is a proximate cause where the injury would not have
occurred but for that negligence." Some of the federal courts, howeYer,
have not given the rule such a liberal interpretation. Cole v. German Sav
ings & Loan Sec., 124 Fed. u3; Mella v. Northern Steams/zip Co., 162 Fed.
513; Je11ni11gs v. Davis, 187 Fed. 703; Ry. Co. v. Gel·vin, 238 Fed. 14- But
see Ry. Co. v. Callaghan, supra, and Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nicholson, 152 Fed.
389. As was decided in the principal case, the question whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of·the injury is for the jury. And
by the weight of authority it would seem that the defendant's negligence
must be considered proximate to the result if the jury find that it contributed in any degree thereto, regardless of the relative degree of culpability
of the third \)erson. Eads v. Cit)• of Marshall, 29 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.)
170 (no official report); Ry. .Co. v. McWhirter, 77 Tex. 356; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; :McCauley v. Norcross, 155 Mass. 584; Hunt v. Ry. Co.,
14 Mo. App. 16o; Tel. Co. v. Gasper, 123 Ky. 128; Lmzdeen v. Elec. Light Co.,
17 Mont. 32.
SSARCHES AND SEizuR-es-CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-EvrnENCE.-D was convicted of having intoxicating liquors in his possession for the purpose of
sale, in violation of a statute. Police officers illegally searched D's residence
without a warrant and the liquor found there was used as evidence against
him, despite objections to its admissibility made at the trial. Held. it was
error, for evidence illegally obtained is admissible in evidence. Yomnan v.
Commonwealth (Ky., 1920), 224 S. W. 860.
"It has long been established," writes Professor Wigmore in his work
on EVIDENCE, page 2955, "that the admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality through which the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence,'' and until recently at least this principle has been followed with
almost unanimity by the courts. See notes in L. R A. 1915 B 834, and
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59. Any doubts cast upon this doctrine in Boyd v.
United States, u6 U. S. 616, were seemingly dispelled in Adams v. New
y ork, 192
585, where the orthodox rule was broadly announced and
followed. However, the Supreme Court had become dissatisfied with its
position and its inevitable result in encouraging such unlawful seizures, r.nd
when the question next came before it in T¥eeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
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383, extricated itsel£ by formulating the rule that evidence unlawfully secured
not be admitted if application be made before its return, and that the
rule announced in the Adams case is applicable only when the objection is
made for the first time upon the trial; and this theory has been followed to
its logical conclusion in Silverstone Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385. Acc~rd, People v. Marxhause11, 204 Mich. 559. In a well-considered
case, Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 5n, Lumpkin, J., speaking for the court,
promulgated the rule that the admissibility of evidence was determined independently of the method by which it was obtained, but evidently suffered a
change of heart when Evans v. State, 106 Ga. SI9, involving admissibility of
evidence unlawfully obtained by search of person without warrant, was before
him, after a futile attempt at reconciliation with the former case; and in
Underwood· v. State, I3 Ga. App. 2o6, the appellate court followed Evans v.
State, supra. The rule declaring illegally obtained evidence inadmissible,
having in its favor the salutary effect of discouraging unlawful seizures, commends itself to the writer, but see 9 ILL. L. REV. 43 for the contrary view.

will

TRUSTS-SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS IN 'l'RUST.-A deposit in a savings
bank was made in the name of the depositor "as trustee" for a named beneficiary. The donor retained possession of the bank book until her death and
no one was informed of the trust during her lifetime. In an action by the
beneficiaries· to enforce the trust, held (one justice dissenting), when not
refuted by a contrary intent a deposit in trust raises a presumption of trust
with· which retention of the bank book is not inconsistent. The trust originates with the donor's act and notice to the beneficiary is not necessary.
Cazallis et al. v. Ingraham et al. (Me., I920), no Atl. 359.
In order to create a trust in personalty, the owner must have the requisite intent and there must be a declaration of such intent. \Vhere money is
deposited in a bank in trust for a third person, the intent may be shown in
various ways. It may be by notice to the donee, or sometimes to a third
person, by delivery of the bank book, by declarations to the donee or third
parties, or by other circumstances connected with the deposit or the depositor's relations to the donee. Alger v. North Encl Savings Bank, 146 Mass.
418; Matter of Halligan, 82 Misc. (N. Y.) 30; Conn. River Savings Bank v.
Albee's Estate, 64 Vt. 5iI; Matter of Davis, II9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 35; Bath
Sa11iizgs Bank v. H atlwm, 88 Me. 122; lvleriga v. M cGonigle, 205 Pa. 321 ;
Robinso1i v. Appleby, 168 App. Div. (N. Y.) 509. But other circumstances
may show ~qually well that there was no intent to make a gift. The deposit
may be to evade taxation laws or legacy duties, Conn. River Savings Bank v.
Albee's Estate, supra; to evade the statute of wills, Nutt v: Morse, 142 Mass.
l; to evade laws limiting the amount of savings deposits, Brabroo.k v. Boston
Five-Cent Savin1;s Bank, 104 Mass. 228; or to take advantage of a higher
interest rate on small deposits, Weber v. Weber, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 2n. In
New York it is declared that a mere deposit in a savings bank by one person of
his own money, in his own name as trustee for another, creates only a tentative trust which is revocable at will until the depositor dies or completes the
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gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery
of the pass book or notice to the beneficiary. Matter of Totten. 179 N. Y.
u2; Stockert v. Dry Dock Sav. Inst., 155 N. Y. App. Div. 123. In Massach•tsetts it appears there must be notice to .the benelciary to perfect the trust. even
though a clear intent may be expressed in other ways. Clark , .. Clar.k, io8
Mass. 522; Cleveland v. Hampden Sai•. Bank. i82 '.\'.lass. no. As is pointed
out in the case of Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455 (in which it is said that
the trust is not complete while the donor retains possession of the bank
book), the conflict between the New York and Massachusetts decisions is not
over the validity of such a trust, but wholly over what is sufficient evidence to
make a question for the jury on the issue of the intention of the depositor
In New Jersey the doctrine of Matter of Totten, supra, is condemned a:;
violating the statute of wills. Nichlas v. Parker, 71 N. J. Eq. 777. The
rule of the Maine court is not in accord with the New York, Massachusetts or New Jersey rules, and may be stated as follows: a dEposit in a bank
in trust for another raises a presumption that a trust was intended, an·i
when not refuted by the showing of a contrary intent creates a trttst which
is completed and irrevocable. Retention of the pass book is not inconsistent
with such intent, neither are subsequent withdrawals inconsistent in the
absence of evidence showing the disposition made of same. This rule would
seem to be an extension of the doctrines previously announced by the Maine
Supreme Court. Barker v. Frye, 75 Me. 29; Bickford v. Mattocks, 95 Me.
547; Savings Bank v. Fogg, II3 Me. 249; Bath Savings Bank v. Hathorn. 88
1\Ie. 122. See article by Bogert on "Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank
Deposits," l CoRN1'1.I. L. QuAR. 159· See also SCO'tT's CASES ON TRus'l's, p.
224, note.

